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Abstract 
Previous studies on the myriad of factors influencing voter behavior tend to presuppose the 
existence of a personal calculus, operating under the assumption that each voter is an 
independent agent making decisions based on how their environment impacts their own standing. 
However, little is known regarding how variations in the economic environment surrounding 
voters, particularly changes in industrial composition and growth in wages relative to one’s 
peers, influence political polarization. Utilizing a weighted regression model based on survey 
data from the Bureau of Labor and Statistics and voter data from each presidential election since 
1992, this study finds evidence that changes in the composition of homogenous industries, 
wherein the economic environment for employees is more closely intertwined through 
unionization and geographic concentration, exhibit a high degree of correlation with changes in 
partisan support. Furthermore, earning higher wages than the average worker in a given industry 
tends to significantly increase support for Republican candidates. These findings present strong 
evidence that changes in how workers’ wages and economic environments compare to their 
peers may play a greater role in influencing partisanship than individual economic health or 
nominal year-end wage growth.  
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  1 
Introduction 
 On June 1st, 2017, president Donald Trump announced his intention to withdraw the 
United States from the Paris Climate Accords. With over 195 signatories, the United Nations-
authored treaty established a framework for individual countries to set their own goals pertaining 
to abating the damage of global warming and climate change. Through explicitly voluntary 
agreements, as well as the establishment of a “Green Climate Fund”, the Accords acknowledged 
the “common but differentiated responsibilities” of its members and varying levels of industrial 
capacity for reform by permitting revenue sharing and common resources to aid all nations 
(United Nations, 2016). Trump, however, found the agreement far too great a burden on 
America’s economic interests. His withdrawal from the agreement ostensibly followed up on 
earlier campaign promises to bolster growth in the manufacturing and coal sectors. In his 
impromptu Rose Garden speech, Trump famously remarked, “I represent the citizens of 
Pittsburg, not Paris” (NY Times, 2017). 
 While most of the world remained as signatories of the agreement, Trump’s actions imply 
that the interests of specific industries play a key role in influencing political decision-making. 
Consider that the Paris Accords served not only as a metaphorical “slap on the wrist” for climate 
change, but as an economic opportunity. In particular, Canada viewed the agreement not as an 
obstacle to growth, but rather an opportunity to build a “cleaner, more innovative economy”, 
setting the optimistic goal of reducing coal dependence in its energy sector by 2030 (Elgie, 
2015). Here in America, the Appalachian coal industry in and around Pittsburg has bigger 
problems to worry about. In Allegheny County, where Pittsburg is located, the size of the natural 
resources and mining sector has been dwindling for years, standing now at less than 0.3% of 
workers and companies in the region (QCED, 2016). With such a small community at risk by the 
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environmental agreement, perhaps Trump’s metaphor was misguided; regardless, the tangible 
effects of his policy actions signal that the interests of discrete industries effect political 
processes. 
 In this study, I make an attempt at uncovering evidence for a theorized relationship 
between industrial composition at the county level and changes in political partisanship across 
the electorate. I hypothesize that as certain industries grow or shrink in terms of how prevalent 
they are at the county level, citizens of those affected regions will tend to vote for certain parties. 
By this logic, coal miners from the Appalachian region — those who overwhelmingly voted for 
Trump in the 2016 election — may have done so in part due to the decline in manufacturing and 
mining jobs over time (Voting and Elections Collection, 2018). Additionally, citizens working in 
the rapidly booming technology and information sectors, such as those near Silicon Valley, may 
tend to vote for Democratic candidates in part due to the growth of their industries. Overall, this 
study seeks to address a gap in previous research regarding political participation and voter 
behavior, which traditionally has focused on either individual motivating factors or national-level 
economic factors, such as those regarding sociotropic or pocketbook voter behavior. 
Furthermore, this study expands on theories elaborated on in sociotropic research by focusing on 
specific industries and their effects on voter behavior, as opposed to previous research 
considering the economy only as a whole. 
 As a notable point of departure from the previous body of literature, this study spends a 
significant amount of time analyzing variations in the degree of homogeneity amongst different 
sectors of the economy, as well as the effects of relative wage growth in terms of analyzing 
employee’s wages. Workers within a specific sector of the economy may experience varying 
degrees of interconnectedness in terms of how they respond to similar economic shocks. This 
Introduction 
 
3 
impacts how workers respond to these shocks in terms of voter behavior. For workers in more 
homogeneous sectors, this study hypothesizes that the effects of economic change are more 
broadly felt, which corresponds to a higher degree of predictability in terms of analyzing voter 
behavior. Additionally, previous studies have focused their attention on nominal wage growth, 
comparing workers in terms of their take-home pay between different years. While this allows 
for comparisons to be drawn between workers regarding their real economic standing, it fails to 
adequately compare how workers consider their wages as compared to those around them. This 
study, therefore considers the effects of relative wage growth, isolating the degree to which 
workers are paid more than their peers in a given industry as an explanatory factor in analyzing 
political polarization.
  4 
Getting to the Polls: Individual Factors for Voter Behavior 
 Studies intending to examine how voters respond to external stimuli must first ask what 
factors influence voters to turn out to polls in the first place. To this end, much of the existing 
literature places heavy emphasis on individual motivating factors that influence one’s likelihood 
to vote in an election. These studies set aside issues of partisanship or election results in order to 
isolate individual deterministic factors for voting while mitigating the risk of confounding 
results. In short, these studies care more about why people vote in the first place, rather than how 
they choose to do so. Understanding what factors lead voters to the polls may provide crucial 
insight into how election results change from year to year. This older branch of political theory 
attempts to explain the individual as a crude economic calculator of sorts, considering the 
relative weights of socioeconomic status, income, education level, and internal valuations of time 
in choosing when to vote. 
Consumption and Resources 
 An older branch of research on voting behavior seeks to explain the individual’s 
decision-making process through elaborate applications of economic theories. These models 
consider voters as rational consumers, fixating on price-based consumption behavior to describe 
a consumer’s willingness to vote. Voting, in this sense, is analogous to a “superior” good sought 
after by many (Crain, 1977). Using such a model has many benefits for researchers, as it fosters 
much explanatory power as to why and under what circumstances people choose to vote in terms 
of incentives; however, its effectiveness has been questioned by some who find flaws in the 
model’s applicability. 
 One of the first to apply a consumption model to voting behavior was Dr. Bruno Frey. 
His research argued that voting has a cost in terms of the consumption of one’s free time (Frey, 
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1971). In this sense, consumers — likely voters — must consider the opportunity costs of their 
time, such as foregone wages and hours that could have been earned by working. While this 
relationship may imply that higher income individuals are less likely to vote, Frey noted that an 
individual’s productivity in the use of their time merits significant consideration as well. For 
higher income consumers, many of which are paid a yearly salary and can afford to leave work, 
the opportunity costs of voting are significantly diminished as compared to those who live 
paycheck to paycheck. Because of this, Frey argues the notably higher voter turnout rates for 
high income individuals is derived from “the proportionally greater weight of efficiency” (Frey, 
1971). 
 Frey’s assertions sparked a rather large debate over the applicability of his model. 
Notably, his work utilized little quantitative data to support his arguments. In order to fill this 
gap of empirical research, Crain’s work tested the validity of this model, eschewing theory with 
data. Using electoral data from 1972, Crain created an empirical model to estimate one’s 
propensity to vote as a function of household income. The model, reliant on regression analysis, 
controlled for a multitude of factors, including education level, unemployment rates, race, 
gender, and overall competitiveness of individual political races. His study found that while 
opportunity costs may be an important factor to consider, income and substitution effects play a 
far greater role in predicting one’s propensity to vote (Crain, 1977). As income increases, Crain 
argued the relative cost of voting decreased; consumers were then more likely to substitute away 
from abstaining from voting and more likely to engage in the political process. 
The Socioeconomic Status Participation Theory 
 One of the strongest and most thoroughly researched branches of theory regarding 
political participation focuses on the impact of socioeconomic status. In short, socioeconomic 
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status (SES) refers to an individual’s economic and sociological position relative to others in a 
region, primarily factoring income, education level, and current occupation (Verba, 1972, 1978). 
In general, most studies find a positive relationship between SES and voter turnout; however, the 
literature seems to disagree over which specific component of SES produces the strongest 
positive effect. 
 In his 1972 study, Verba examined not only the effects of socioeconomic status on 
voting, but on less explicit forms of participation in general. Through survey data, his study 
argued a stronger correlation between SES and participation exists for more “difficult” types of 
engagement beyond voting, including volunteerism and activism (Verba, 1972). Additionally, 
the study found that higher levels of SES positively correlate with higher levels of general 
interest in the political system, making citizens far more likely to interact with their political 
systems. 
 Education levels have received special attention from researchers, even described by 
Olsen as “the most powerful predictor” among socioeconomic factors (Olsen, 1982). Using 
survey and voter data from both the United States and Sweden, the study not only found that 
education levels were the most predictive of all SES factors, but that its indirect effects — 
socialization or acquisition of civil skills, for example — played a large role as well (Olsen, 
1982). The study discredited the role of SES based on income and occupation alone, as the data 
found no direct relationship between these factors and voting behavior. More recently, 
researchers have begun to doubt the strength of education’s impact on voter turnout. In 
particular, researchers Kam and Palmer believed education to be a more auxiliary role to a more 
direct causal mechanism. Using a carefully designed propensity-score matching test to connect 
pre-adult experiences with education level, the study found virtually no effect on higher 
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education levels on voter behavior (Kam, 2008). Instead, their research suggests education 
functions more as a proxy for socialization and pre-adult experiences with family members and 
local communities that instill the value of political participation in citizens. 
 In relation to the consumption and resource-based models discussed earlier, some 
researchers have taken a similar approach in describing the effects of socioeconomic status. In 
his 1993 study, Hansen examined voter data from the United States to identify the role of 
mobilization and individual considerations as they relate to voter behavior. His research found 
that at the most basic level, voters choose to participate based on the perceived benefits of doing 
so (Hansen, 1993). For citizens, the “costs” of participation include income, education, age and 
race, while the “benefits” include a sense of partisanship and feeling of closeness toward 
particular candidates. After data examination, Hansen discovered that declines in turnout can be 
traced to a lack of effort from political entities to mobilize potential supporters, creating a 
weakened state of social involvement for many communities. His study acknowledges the 
importance of SES in evaluating participation; however, his focus on mobilization of supporters 
is important to note, as it is necessary for proper analysis of socioeconomic status.  
Despite the breadth of research on socioeconomic status, there are some who disagree 
with the literature consensus and doubt its predictive power on participation. Cho noted that 
although there is much empirical evidence to support the positive correlation between SES and 
voter turnout, there still remain instances of lower socioeconomic individuals participating at 
higher levels than their higher socioeconomic counterparts (Cho, 2006). This  
fact led Cho to investigate what other factors may be responsible for such discrepancies. Using 
data and participation patters from multiple Arab-American nations, this study argued that 
socioeconomic status may be yet another proxy for external factors. In particular, the study 
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argues for increased attention toward socialization experiences and policy threats. Cho asserts if 
the political climate that individuals live in includes the “apprehension of worrisome (...) policy 
actions”, it may actually motivate low socioeconomic individuals who had the ability to 
participate, but in past years chose not to do so (Cho, 2006). While Cho’s work does not 
represent the literature as a whole, his findings garner merit and are worth ample consideration. 
Effects of Income 
It is well documented in the literature and income level and voter turnout are positively 
correlated (Bruno, 1971). Bruno’s previously mentioned study on the effects of income on 
political participation argued this point using an economic consumption model, demonstrating 
that higher incomes make it relatively less costly for voters to miss hours of work in order to 
reach the polls. While the opportunity cost of voting increases, the efficiency and productivity 
lost from missing work decreasing as incomes rise, making high income individuals more likely 
to vote (Bruno, 1971). Multiple other studies have brought up their own explanations in response 
to Bruno’s work. In general, while these studies generally agree upon the positive relationship 
between income and political participation, they challenge the idea that high-income individuals 
are more efficient at voting, and that this factor alone makes them more likely to vote. In a 
rebuttal, Keith argues that high-income individuals simply have more time available for them to 
vote, as compared to lower-income individuals who likely cannot afford or don’t have the ability 
to miss out on work (Keith, 1972). In a separate response, Fraser follows the same line of 
reasoning as Keith, arguing that opportunity costs for high-income individuals are actually 
incredibly low, as it is very easy for them to leave work. Because there is no “punishment” for 
leaving work for such employees, who in many cases are salaried, their opportunity costs in 
relation to voting are far lower, making them more likely to vote (Keith, 1972). In summary, 
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while the literature continues to debate the exact causal mechanism of the proposed positive 
relationship between higher incomes and political participation, the vast majority of political 
scientists believe the correlation exists.
  10 
From Individual to National Theories 
 Having reviewed the factors driving voters to the polls, the literature transitions into a 
thorough discussion regarding how voters choose to cast their ballots. A myriad of competing 
explanatory theories exist to predict the voting behavior of particular blocs; however, for the 
purposes of this study, economic motivators will be given primary focus.  
Previous research has already concluded that the national economy —specifically the 
impacts of macroeconomic change — are of vital importance in examining American elections 
(Kinder, 1981). Bloom and Price from Harvard University first hypothesized a relationship 
between voting behavior and economic conditions, particularly in times of prosperity. Their 
study, analyzing consumption and voter behavior during the 1970’s, found that changes in one’s 
short-run real income corresponded to a measurable change in partisan voting behavior (Bloom, 
1975). These changes can stem from a variety of sources. As Figure 1 demonstrates, short-run 
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changes in income are derived not only from changes in wages or hours worked, but also 
changes in price levels (Bloom, 1975). Additionally, their research suggested that short-run 
economic changes, which are realized at the individual level more easily than long run economic 
growth or decline, have the greatest impact on observed voting behavior. 
This hypothesis was further tested by analyzing election data from the national vote for 
the US House of Representatives. With data spanning nearly seven decades of elections, 
Kramer’s statistical analysis of voter behavior determined that election outcomes have an 
explicitly “rational” response to objective changes occurring under the incumbent party (Kramer, 
1971). In some cases, economic changes accounted for nearly half of the variance in 
congressional elections; however, presidential elections were found to be far less responsive. 
Furthermore, real income seemed to be the most influential economic factor, confirming the 
model set forth by Bloom and Howard (Kramer, 1971). While some studies have expressed 
skepticism at the raw predictive power of these models, especially as they pertain to the 
presidency, these studies imply that economic health has a pervasive and tangible impact on 
voter behavior (Meltzer, 1975). 
Pocketbook and Sociotropic Theories 
While studies have confirmed the economy’s impact on voter behavior, the literature is 
less conclusive on the specifics of how the economy’s changes manifest themselves in 
observable patterns of voter behavior. To this end, the literature separates itself into two main 
strands. The first, known as pocketbook voting, refers to voters who consider economic 
conditions only insofar as they impact their own financial situation (Kinder, 1981). Pocketbook 
voters, as the term implies, are influenced almost entirely by the prospects of their private lives 
being influenced by public policy. Such voters support candidates and political parties that 
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advocate for policies that improve their own economic interests, rather than the interests of the 
nation at large. Conversely, pocketbook voters directly oppose candidates that appear to threaten 
their own financial health (Kinder, 1981). Research into pocketbook voters long controlled the 
study of political behavior, dominating scholarly thought on the subject for decades.  
By the 1980’s a new category of voters emerged to factor the role of nationwide 
economic health in how the electorate chooses to vote. Meehl first noted that previous research 
on voter behavior failed to address the staunch unlikelihood that individual behavior could 
influence election results on a large scale, such as those for a presidential race (Meehl 1977). 
Instead, he alluded to the existence of a more sociotropic form of voting, one where voters take 
into account the “collective interest” of the country. This school of thought, now formalized as 
sociotropic voting, refers to voters that are influenced most heavily by the nation’s overall 
economic health (Kinder, 1981). To be clear, sociotropic voters are by no means altruists, as 
Meehl fervently asserts (Meehl, 1977). Instead, sociotropic voters vote according to the 
“country’s pocketbook” rather than their own, supporting candidates that appear to have 
improved the nation’s overall economic well-being as opposed to solely their own financial 
standing (Kinder, 1981). 
By and large, most modern political science research considers sociotropic voting to 
better explain voter behavior as opposed to pocketbook voting. In a survey of economic data 
from 1956 to 1984, Markus found that while notions of pocketbook voting certainty exist and are 
noteworthy, changes in macroeconomic data matter far more (Markus, 1988). This is not to say 
that pocketbook voting garners no significance; on the contrary, such voting behavior has a 
modest impact on individual voting behavior. However, from the perspective of the nation as a 
whole, the calculus of voting trends toward a sociotropic perspective (Markus, 1988). Once 
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more, income remained the most important factor in regression results, with each 1% change in 
real income corresponding to a 2.3% change in probability of voting for the incumbent party 
(Markus, 1988). 
Further research into both pocketbook and sociotropic voting attempts to further qualify 
how voters evaluate economic conditions into their decision-making, specifically considering 
which economic factors voters consider and when. Much of the debate around this issue centers 
upon whether voters look retrospectively at past economic conditions or prospectively at 
hypothesized future conditions (Linn, 2010). In general, the academic opinion on this issue is 
mixed. While results on an individual-level analysis are inconclusive, the overall body of 
evidence suggests that voters tend to vote more prospectively than retrospectively (Linn, 2010). 
Additionally, this effect is further bolstered when no incumbent is running for reelection. 
Finally, researchers have given special attention to situations of divided government, 
where the party in control of congress does not match that of the President. These situations 
present an interesting dilemma for voters, as they must choose who to attribute changes in 
economic health to, either congress or the President. In such cases, Norpoth places voters into 
four distinct categories: 
1. Hung Jury: Voters cannot decide between the two candidates, so no economic votes 
are cast. 
2. Split Decision: Voting at the presidential level reflects the president’s party, while 
voting at the congressional level reflects on the party in control of congress. 
3. President Liable: All blame is levied against the President’s party, in both 
presidential and congressional elections. 
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4. Congress Liable: All blame is levied against Congress’ party, in both presidential and 
congressional elections. 
In his research, parsing over the exit poll data of voters during times of divided government, 
Norpoth found most support for the President Liable thesis, implying that the vast majority of 
voters’ economic evaluations trend toward actions undertaken by the President’s party. (Norpoth, 
2001). Unfortunately, his study did not consider times of unified government, thereby 
undermining the conceptual validity of his conclusions. Regardless, his work implies that divided 
government may obscure the effects of economic voting on a national scale (Linn, 2010). 
Whereas the delineation between sociotropic and pocketbook appears clear, not all voters will 
attribute economic change to the same people, let alone the same party. As such, studies into 
economic voting must take into consideration the multifaceted analysis voters undergo when 
choosing how to vote. 
Considering the Accuracy of Economic Assessments 
 The preceding theories on economic voting are underpinned by the assumption that 
individual voters have the economic knowledge necessary to assess the health of the economy in 
some way. While it is comparatively easier to assess one’s own economic standing — as a 
pocketbook voter would — much of the citizenry may not have the knowledge necessary to 
assess national economic indicators. As such, individual assessments of the economy, and 
therefore economic voting in general, are subject to multiple biases. In fact, a 1995 study 
conducted by Goidel and Langly found that the tone of news coverage regarding the nation’s 
economic health strongly correlated with public opinion, even when controlling for real 
economic conditions (Goidel, 1995). These findings hint at American citizens’ relative ineptitude 
at remaining impartial when attempting to understand the ebbs and flows of the economy.  
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 A large source of bias comes from partisan influence. Gerber and Huber investigated this 
theory by directly examining variations in economic behavior. Using panel surveys from the 
November 2006 midterm elections, their research found that strong partisans tend to evaluate the 
economy in a more positive light when their respective party has control of the presidency 
(Gerber, 2009). This, they argue, stems from the idea that partisans hold differing beliefs on the 
economic competence of each party, depending on which party they support. This salient impact 
on how voters evaluate the economy may occur for a variety of reasons. Alongside 
aforementioned issues of race and socioeconomic status, Gerber argued that there exists a 
correlation between perceived economic performance and opinions of a political party; 
psychologically, voters tend to overestimate economic performance and attribute economic 
successes to parties they like, and vice versa (Gerber, 2009). This study casts doubt on the 
infallibility of voters’ economic knowledge and implies that partisanship imbues a noteworthy 
bias on voters. 
 In a further study, Gerber and Huber sought to explain this hypothesized relationship by 
directly examining consumption habits. Using county-level quarterly taxable sales as a proxy for 
consumption habits, their study found that partisanship actively influences post-presidential 
consumption level (Gerber, 2010). This, they argue, indicates voters’ beliefs about the economy, 
rather than simply party support. In times of perceived economic decline, voters tend to consume 
less; in times of perceived growth, voters tend to consume more. This result also correlates with 
a county’s “partisan complexion”, indicating that partisanship has a direct and active effect on 
both consumption and perceptions of the economy (Gerber, 2010). Also, Gerber noted that voters 
respond quickly in the short-term to changes in their economic situation, confirming the opinions 
of previous researchers that short-term economic change is of vital importance in examining 
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voter behavior (Gerber, 2010). Overall, Gerber and Huber’s contributions to the literature 
demonstrate that voters can be biased in their economic evaluations, and that partisanship, 
through its direct effects on economic voting, may breed more biased partisanship on its own.  
Previous research has successfully analyzed a wide range of factors that influence voting 
behavior, from individual characteristics to manifestations of attitudes toward national economic 
trends. However, research on the direct effects of the economy on voter patterns has been 
constrained to either overly-broad metrics — including Gross Domestic Product or 
unemployment, which may not apply or be relevant to the average voter — or considers the 
overall economy as a single unit of analysis. This study proposes a different approach, wherein 
the varying sectors of the economy are treated as unique agents rather than being bundled 
together as one. Industries, both how they grow and migrate over time, provide the central unit of 
analysis for this study. In doing so, direct attention can be paid on if and how variations in 
industrial composition might influence voting behavior.
  17 
Methodology 
In this section, I outline the origins of the data used for this study, as well as the 
methodological and design choices employed. This study investigates how changes in industrial 
health between presidential elections correspond to changes in partisan voting behavior. 
Focusing on data at the county level allows for a greater degree of discretion and specificity in 
analyzing the results, as it accounts for highly concentrated sectors of the economy that may not 
receive proper representation at the state or national level. Using election returns data and 
employment data from the Bureau of Labor and Statistics, this study attempts to uncover a 
weighted linear regression between changes in industrial composition and changes in 
partisanship at the county level. In all, my study attempts to answer five key questions: 
I. Is there an observable relationship between changes in industrial composition at the 
county level and changes in voting behavior? 
II. What economic indicators — employment rates, establishment levels, or earned wages— 
best measure the health and relative prevalence of an industry at the county level? 
III. What industries/indicators, if any, exhibit this hypothesized relationship? Is this 
relationship stronger for some industries/indicators than others? 
IV. Is this relationship stronger in areas of the country with a strongly concentrated industry? 
V. Does this relationship remain after examining external factors, such as incumbency 
advantage or turnout rates? 
Data 
To create the large data set necessary for my analysis, I merged information about the 
industrial composition and employment rates for each US county with each county’s respective 
presidential election results. Doing so allowed for specific comparisons to be drawn between 
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each cast ballots and the unique economic environments from which they originated. 
Furthermore, the choice to focus solely on presidential election results stems from a desire to 
reaffirm Norpoth’s Presidential Liability Hypothesis mentioned earlier, among other issues of 
data availability and ease of instituting adequate controls. This study, therefore, places greater 
emphasis on changes in voter behavior between presidential elections, rather than accounting for 
the myriad of other relevant elections — most notably congressional elections — that occur 
during a president’s term. Finally, this data set only considers economic and employment data 
from the year of the relevant election itself, rather than creating a weighted average of economic 
data from the four years prior to said election. This allows for a more accurate depiction of 
change between elections, which are hypothesized to matter more in determining voter behavior 
than swings in industrial composition before the election year itself. Short run variations in 
economic composition or output in the interim periods between elections are irrelevant; instead, 
the data places greater emphasis on the magnitude of overall change between elections. 
 The data set incorporates industrial and voter data from each of the seven presidential 
elections between 1992 to 2016. The reasons for such a seemingly narrow set of data are 
twofold. First and foremost, beginning with Bill Clinton’s election in 1992 allows me to compare 
and contrast the growth and decline of two major industries relevant to popular political 
discourse. These two industries are the mining sector — particularly coal mining — and the 
technology sector. President Clinton’s election marked the beginning of the exponential rise in 
internet usage across the globe, gaining an average of 345 million users from 1995 to 2000 
(Internet Growth Statistics, 2018). Clinton himself explicitly advocated for growth in the internet 
and technology sectors, arguing that innovations in the field will, among other things, “enable 
universities to communicate with each other 100 to 1000 times faster than they can do today” 
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(Lawler, 1996). This immense growth directly contrasts with the marked decline in mining 
across the US. The number of employed coal miners, mostly concentrated in the Appalachian 
region, has been reduced by over half in the past two decades, from a peak of around 140,000 in 
1990 to less than 60,000 today (US BLS, Mining and Logging: Coal Mining, 2018). These 
findings, which seem to reaffirm previous studies analyzing the flexibility of the US service-
based economy and departure from raw manufacturing and mining work, present a fantastic 
framework for voter behavior analysis (Christopherson, 1989). While this study focuses on far 
more than two industries, choosing a narrower timeframe allows for greater scrutiny in analysis 
toward these increasingly relevant and noteworthy fields in American political discourse. 
Finally, modern industrial data from the Bureau of Labor and Statistics only stretches back as far 
as 1992, presenting a more practical obstacle to a broader analysis. 
 Industrial composition data originates from the US Bureau of Labor and Statistics’ 
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), compiled at the county level for every 
presidential election since 1992 (Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages — Data Files, 
2018). This census utilizes the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), 
dividing the US economy into two major supersectors, which are then further categorized into 
individual sectors. An explanation of the specific NAICS industry classifications utilized in this 
study can be found in Appendix I. The QCEW uses three primary metrics to measure industrial 
composition of each sector of the economy at the county level: Total Employment, Total 
Establishments, and Wage Quotient (Glossary, 2018). Each of these metrics is computed as an 
annual average of quarterly data. Total Employment is defined as the total number of persons 
aged 16 or older who, during a reference week: 
a) Did at least one hour of work as paid employees, or 
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b) Did not work but held jobs or owned businesses from which they were temporarily 
absent due to vacation, illness, weather, childcare, etc. 
Each employed person is counted only once and in only one industrial sector, even if he or she 
holds more than one job. This definition explicitly excludes homemakers, entrepreneurs or others 
whose work is confined to their own home, or volunteerism. Total Establishments refers to the 
number of establishments — physical locations of a specific economic activity (I.E. a factory, 
mine, office) that produces a single good or service — that exist in a particular sector (Glossary, 
2018). Finally, the QCEW records a Wage Quotient for each sector to analyze the relative wage 
level of a particular sector within a county as compared to the national average wage of that 
sector for the entire country, referred to as the “base area”. The wage quotient is computed by 
using the following formula: 
𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒	𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 = (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠	𝑖𝑛	𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦	𝑋	𝑖𝑛	𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑠	𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎)𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠	𝑖𝑛	𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑠	𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠	𝑖𝑛	𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦	𝑋	𝑖𝑛	𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒	𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎)𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠	𝑖𝑛	𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒	𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎  
Using a wage quotient, rather than simply comparing the aggregate wages of each sector, 
eliminates comparison problems inherent to normative analysis of wage growth by allowing for a 
more accurate analysis of voter behavior by measuring variations in real pay across sectors 
themselves. For example, a county with a wage quotient of 2.0 in sector X implies that its 
workers are paid twice as much as the national average worker in that sector (Glossary, 2018). In 
all, these three statistics serve as the primary economic indicators of interest for analyzing 
industrial composition across counties. 
 Finally, the CQ Press Library’s Voting and Elections Collection provides voter data from 
each presidential election since 1992 (Voting and Elections Collection, 2018). These data sets 
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include county-level voter data for each US county, including percent vote shares and total 
number of votes casts for each candidate. For this study, I consider only votes cast for the official 
nominees of the Democratic and Republican parties, excluding third party or write-in ballots. CQ 
data only lists one “third party” per election, generally the party with the highest vote share out 
of all challengers; as such, there is too much variation in the ideologies of which third party had 
the greatest vote share from election to election to derive any meaningful results from analyzing 
them. Therefore, this data set focuses primarily on the “Major Percentage” statistic provided by 
CQ for each party, defined as the total number of votes per party cast for either the Democratic 
or Republican party divided by the total votes cast for only both major parties, excluding any 
challengers or write-in votes (Voting and Elections Collection, 2018). Finally, a new statistic 
referred to in the data as Vote Share, was created in the process of formatting CQ data, utilizing 
its data on the total number of votes cast per county. This metric is figured by dividing the total 
number of votes in a county by the total number of votes in the entire election. Figuring vote 
share enables a meaningful weighted least squares analysis to occur, factoring the relative 
importance of each county’s voters in terms of the percentage of votes cast by a particular county 
into my findings. 
Formatting and Design 
 In a large combined data set, voter data for each individual county was matched with its 
corresponding QCEW data, effectively organizing the data by county. The specific coding 
necessary for this process can be found in Appendix II. From here, four metrics were calculated 
to identify the relative size and density of each industry, as well as the relative size of each 
county in terms of its impact on the election. These four metrics include Establishment Ratio, 
Employment Ratio, Wage Quotient, and Voter Share. Calculating these ratios allows for further 
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comparisons to be drawn between counties in terms of the magnitude of variations in industrial 
composition. The specific formulas for each metric are further elaborated on in Table 1. Using 
proprietary ratios, rather than simply analyzing the raw number of workers or establishments in a 
particular sector, controls for variation in population and provides a more accurate sense of the 
composition of industries in a county. Wage quotient remains unchanged by industry, as it 
already exists as a ratio, and requires no further calculation. Where values were invalid or 
equated to 0 — especially for counties with certain industries left unrepresented — a value of 
“N/A” was entered and not considered in any further analysis. Furthermore, as this data set 
considers seven specific elections, each county and its respective economic and voter data were 
coded with the specific years they represented. In all, this combined data set comprised of 
industrial composition and voter data for each county, repeated seven times for each presidential 
election considered. 
TABLE 1: METRICS OF INDUSTRIAL COMPOSITION 
ESTABLISHMENT 
RATIO 
#	𝑜𝑓	𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑛𝑡𝑠	𝑖𝑛	𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦	𝑋#	𝑜𝑓	𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑠ℎ𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠	𝑖𝑛	𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦 
EMPLOYMENT 
RATIO 
#	𝑜𝑓	𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠	𝑖𝑛	𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦	𝑋#	𝑜𝑓	𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒𝑠	𝑖𝑛	𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦 
WAGE QUOTIENT (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠	𝑖𝑛	𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦	𝑋	𝑖𝑛	𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑠	𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎)𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠	𝑖𝑛	𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑠	𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠	𝑖𝑛	𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦	𝑋	𝑖𝑛	𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒	𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎)𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠	𝑖𝑛	𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒	𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎  
VOTER SHARE #	𝑜𝑓	𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠	𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑡	𝑏𝑦	𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦	𝑋#	𝑜𝑓	𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠	𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑡	𝑖𝑛	𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  
At this point, the data is only capable of measuring the nominal differences in voter 
support for both major political parties between elections, and how these differences relate to the 
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size of a given industry during an election year. For example, if the Manufacturing sector 
establishment ratio in Oakland County, MI grew by ten percentage points between the 2004 and 
2008 presidential elections, the data could identify the corresponding growth in voter share 
between Democratic candidates John Kerry and Barrack Obama. However, the actual size of the 
growth in voter share is irrelevant; what matters instead is the change between elections. Without 
factoring in the degree of change in voter share between elections, this study cannot accurately 
assess the impacts of changes in industrial composition on changes in voter behavior between 
elections. 
Since change in voter behavior serves as the primary dependent variable of focus for this 
study, my methodological design necessitated the creation of election pairs, created to account 
for changes in each proprietary metric between elections. By combining each of the seven 
elections studied into six election pairs, the data can more accurately depict the changes in voter 
behavior and industrial composition that occur between elections, rather than being limited to 
studying ambiguous variations in nominal vote share for candidates. For example, the change in 
voter and industrial data between Clinton’s 1992 election and 1996 reelection is considered as 
one of six election pairs. This new metric, using inputs from the previous data set sorted by year, 
calculated the change in majority voter share for both Democrats and Republicans at the county 
level between elections. Additionally, the changes in each of the proprietary metrics of industrial 
composition for each industry was recorded, providing insight into how a county’s economy 
changed between elections. This data set remained organized by county; however, each county 
was tagged with which election pair it represented, resulting in six entries for each county, 
corresponding to the six elections pairs created by this analysis. Calculating change at the county 
level allows for regression analysis to consider change in majority voter share for Democrats and 
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Republicans as a function of change in specific industrial indicators for each industry at the 
county level. 
 With the data now fully organized, analysis proceeded by conducting a weighted least 
squares regression, considering change in voter share for both major parties as a function of 
changes in each of the three industrial composition metrics by each unique industry. Each data 
point is weighted by the respective county’s total voter share. Choosing to consider voter share 
over other competing metrics of population density, including each county’s share of the US 
population, helps to exclude portions of the non-voting population that do not relate to this 
study’s hypothesized relationship. This study seeks to examine voter behavior, not citizen 
behavior; as such, considering total population would skew results away from voters and toward 
citizens who have no bearing on the elections in question. For each industrial composition 
indicator, the regression table calculates the predicted percent change in voter share for both 
Republicans and Democrats as a function of percent change in the aforementioned indicator for 
every industry. Since Republican and Democratic voter share equate to 100% of the analyzed 
vote, the additive inverse of regression results for one party equals the regression results for the 
other. This eliminates the need to conduct redundant regression analysis for both parties. These 
results are referred to as national regression results, indicating the observed relationship between 
voter share and industrial composition as an average of the entire country.  
 Additional regression analysis considered variations in this relationship between the 
national average and concentrated baskets of the economy with highly concentrated industries. 
To conduct this analysis, the data was further divided into individual subgroups for each 
industry, consisting of counties for which the establishment ratio of the relevant industry 
exceeded a certain percentile. The specific threshold used matters little; any threshold used above 
Methodology 
 
25 
the 50th percentile would effectively create a subgroup more concentrated than the national 
average. However, choosing a constant threshold necessarily entails a tradeoff between two 
competing obstacles. Choosing too low a threshold would return a large subgroup, one that could 
potentially be too large to derive any meaning from. On the other hand, choosing too high a 
threshold would artificially limit the size of my subgroups to such a small number of data points 
that could return insignificant results. With these competing tradeoffs in mind, I choose to search 
for a natural threshold of sorts.  
Ultimately, the rationale for choosing the 85th percentile as a cutoff for sorting came from 
their investigation into the relative distributions of establishment ratios across industries. For 
example, in the manufacturing sector, the 50th percentile establishment ratio equaled 0.0486, 
with its 85th percentile equaling 0.0707 (QCEW, 2018). In Figure 2, a histogram of the 
distribution of manufacturing establishment ratios exhibits a long tailed normal distribution 
which begins to divide at approximately the 85th percentile. As such, I chose to divide my 
industries at the 85th percentile, as the data appeared to show a clear demarcation between highly 
concentrated industries and the average basket of industrial composition at the 85th percentile. 
While this cutoff may appear arbitrary, it adequately serves its purpose of creating highly 
concentrated subgroups while minimizing the risk of conducting data analysis with too large or 
too small a data set. With each industry divided between its national average and a highly 
concentrated basket of counties with establishment ratios above the 85th percentile, additional 
regression analysis of the same nature as previously conducted can occur. This allows for 
comparisons to be made between the regression relationship at the national level and the 
relationship for highly concentrated counties in each industry. 
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 Finally, a variety of further tests were conducted with the national-level data to account 
for external factors, including incumbency and voter turnout. Doing so tests the robustness of the 
hypothesized relationship in the regression data when accounting for external factors 
simultaneously influencing voter behavior. In order to account for incumbency advantage, 
defined mathematically as the benefit the incumbent president receives in running for reelection 
as a function of the difference between the proportion of the vote earned by the incumbent and 
the proportion of the vote received by the entire party, each election pair was placed into two 
groups (Gelman, 1990). The first, termed the incumbency group, consists of elections where the 
incumbent president won reelection — 1996, 2004, and 2012. The second, termed the non-
incumbency group, consists of elections where either the incumbent lost, or two new candidates 
ran for office —2000, 2008, and 2016. From here, each group underwent the same national 
regression analysis, allowing these results to be compared with the national average and identify 
what effect incumbency has on the results. 
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To analyze the effects of varying degrees of voter turnout, another two groups of 
elections were created, this time corresponding to election pairs with the highest and lowest 
turnout, as measured by voter data. Using the average turnout between both elections in a pair as 
the metric to be compared, the high turnout group consisted of the three most recent election 
pairs, whereas the low turnout group consisted of the three oldest election pairs (Voting and 
Elections Collection, 2018). Again, the same comparisons can be drawn with the national data by 
subjecting each turnout group to regression analysis, then comparing the results to the national 
regression results. This allows for the effects of turnout to be considered in my analysis. 
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Analysis 
 In this section, I analyze and discuss the results of the aforementioned regression tests 
conducted with the combined QCED and Voting and Elections Collection data. The results of 
these regression tests are contained within Appendix III, which contains Tables 2-8 of regression 
results. I begin by analyzing the results of the national regression results, which are then further 
broken down by specific industries. Second, I discuss my findings from regression testing of 
several highly concentrated regions of the economy. Finally, I go more in depth into regression 
testing based on changes in wage ratio, as well as address multiple tests regarding incumbency 
and voter turnout. A guide to interpreting each regression table can be found at the beginning of 
Appendix III. For the sake of clarity, each regression table lists the estimated linear relationship 
as it pertains to changes in Democratic vote share. 
Establishment Ratio-Based Regressions 
 Table 2 lists the R-Squared values from the national regression output, sorted by which 
economic indicator was utilized as the independent variable of partisan change. As this table 
shows, regression tests relying upon changes in establishment ratios explained a greater share of 
variation in the data than either employment or wage ratios. In fact, the percentage of variation 
explained by changes in establishment ratios — nearly 7% — is nearly double that of 
employment ratios. While this figure seems small, it is important to keep in mind that this study 
analyzes one of the many contributing factors to voter behavior in the US. An R-Squared 
coefficient of 7 percent implies that variation in one of many variables explains seven percent of 
variation in the data. If further studies were to control for other factors in the calculus of voter 
behavior, this figure would almost certainly be higher. More importantly, however, this result 
implies that placing more weight on changes in establishment ratios over employment or wage 
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ratios may explain more of the hypothesized variation in voter behavior. For this reason, further 
analysis of both national and regional regression results focuses only on those explained by 
variations in establishment ratios. 
 Table 3 displays the national regression results relating to changes in establishment ratio, 
broken down by industry. Looking at the P-values of each industry, the regression results 
indicate that changes in county-level ratios for eight of the thirteen individual industries tested 
show no significant correlation to changes in Democratic vote share. Natural Resources and 
Mining was particularly insignificant, with a P-value above 0.8. However, five industries in 
particular exhibited a statistically significant relationship between changes in establishment ratio 
and Democratic vote share. These industries were: 
• Trade, Transportation, and Utilities 
• Information 
• Education and Health 
• Other Services (except Public Administration) 
• Government (Federal) 
Outside of the federal government, an increase in the establishment ratio of these four industries 
showed a statistically significant decline in Democratic vote share. The magnitude of this decline 
varied by industry, with an average coefficient of -40.75. This signifies that for a county that saw 
its proportion of establishments in a particular industry grow by ten percent, one could expect 
Democratic vote share to decline by nearly 4.1 points. Democratic vote share appears 
particularly sensitive to changes in the establishment ratio for Information-sector companies, as 
its coefficient reached over -100. This implies that in any given county, for every one-point 
increase in the establishment ratio of the information sector, Democratic vote share declines 
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nearly 100 times as much. From these results, regression analysis implies that the 
aforementioned industries are likely most relevant for further investigation into the hypothesized 
relationship in this study. Furthermore, growth in these industries seems, at least in a strict 
statistical sense, correlated to a decline in Democratic vote share. 
 Regression analysis on the effects of change in the federal government returned 
surprisingly strong results. As the final line of Table 3 shows, growth in the ratio of federal 
government establishments correlated with an over 500-point increase in Democratic vote share. 
This staggeringly high figure, combined with its high level of statistical significance, may imply 
that growth of the federal government serves as a massive benefit for Democrats in office; 
however, this figure must be treated with caution. Figure 3 shows a plot of the average 
establishment ratio for federal government institutions for all US counties. This histogram 
exhibits a long-tailed distribution, with the average establishment ratio equaling less than 1% 
(QCED, 2016). It is safe to say, therefore, that most counties’ economies do not rely heavily on 
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— if at all —the presence of federal government institutions. In terms of regression analysis, this 
signals a lack of applicable data for this model, meaning the recorded coefficient has likely been 
overestimated. As such, I must discount the relevance of this metric; it has been omitted from 
any further analysis. 
 Table 4 shows the results of regional-based regression analysis, using subsets of the data 
consisting of counties exhibiting an establishment ratio above the 85th percentile for three of the 
statistically significant industries found in table 3. Notably, Other Services are excluded from 
this table. As the NAICS explains, Other Services serves as a catch-all category of sorts, 
bundling together an assortment of industries that do not meet the criteria for any already-
established classification. This means that comparisons across counties might not be comparing 
the same jobs; one county’s “other services” could comprise of religious industries, while 
another might include laundry services. As such, using this category provides no meaningful 
method of comparing between same industries. 
 Table 4 allows for comparisons to be drawn between the national regression results and 
more concentrated regional results, broken down by each industry. Unfortunately, segregating 
the economy by its most highly concentrated sectors did not strengthen neither the statistical 
significance nor the strength of the coefficient on voter share change. In fact, for both the Trade 
and Information sectors, the direction of the coefficient actually reversed. In general, no 
discernable pattern could be distinguished between national regression and regional regression 
results. This implies that analyzing data solely from counties with highly concentrated and 
statistically significant industries did nothing to bolster the validity of the correlation. 
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Wage Ratio-Based Regressions 
 Regression analysis on changes in wage ratio explained a lower percentage of variation in 
the data — around 4.1%, per Table 2 — than establishment ratio. However, while not as 
statistically significant in terms of R-Squared figures, focusing on changes in wage ratio returned 
surprisingly significant and profoundly interesting results. Table 5 lists the results of this 
regression test, in a similar format as Table 3. With the notable exception of the Service 
supersector, every industry exhibited a negative coefficient of change in voter share for 
Democrats in response to an increase in wage ratio. The magnitude of these coefficients appears 
tightly bunched, all within an order of magnitude of one another. Notably, each coefficient is 
smaller in magnitude than the coefficients found in analyzing the effects of change in 
establishment ratio; most industries show an average 2.45-point drop in Democratic vote share 
for every 1-point increase in wage ratio. In other words, as workers begin to make double the 
average salary of the average worker in that industry, Democrats gain a two to three percentage 
point boost in their electoral performance. Finally, the coefficient of change for each industry is 
remarkably significant; the P-values for each industry appear to approach zero. These results 
imply that Democratic vote share suffers from negative changes in wages. However, this does 
not mean that growth in nominal wages influences partisanship; rather, by nature of the wage 
ratio statistic, these results indicate that Democratic vote share begins to decrease when workers 
of nearly every industry begin receiving wages above that of their peer average. 
 To further examine the robustness of this correlation, Table 6 shows regional regression 
results based on wage ratio changes, divided by the same significant industries identified by the 
analysis conducted in Table 4. Overall, the negative correlation between wage ratio and 
Democratic vote share remains intact, even after segmenting the economy by its most highly 
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concentrated sectors. The average coefficient of change increased in magnitude from -2.45 to -
4.69. In counties with highly concentrated Education and Health sectors, this relationship 
suffered in terms of significance, with P-values growing on average as compared to the national 
results. Additionally, the average coefficient of change for this sector is -3.3104, which is more 
than a point lower than average. However, for the remaining two industries, the relationship 
between wage ratios and Democratic vote share change remained significant and strong. Table 6 
demonstrates that the observed linear relationship between wage ratios and partisanship persists 
in counties with concentrated industries, although this finding comes with a few exceptions. 
 Finally, Tables 7 and 8 explore whether incumbency effects or variations in voter turnout 
impact the resilience of this relationship. Beginning with incumbency effects, Table 7 splits 
national regression results into two groups, one where incumbent candidates won reelection and 
the other where entirely new challengers ran for election. For elections in transition between 
incumbent administrations, the relationship between changes in wage ratio and Democratic vote 
share remains intact, if not more statistically significant than in Table 5. The average coefficient 
of change in Democratic vote share reaches -7.94 — higher than any observed average in the 
previous tables. Notably, the coefficient of change in the Leisure and Hospitality industry 
deviates from the trend, reversing signs into a positive 3.15-point benefit for Democrats. Despite 
this outlying example, it appears that increases in wage ratio remain negatively correlated with 
Democratic vote share in cases where incumbency advantage plays no role. 
 When incumbency advantages are in play, contrary to previous findings, the data shows 
less conclusive evidence in support of a correlation between wage ratio changes and Democratic 
vote share. As Table 7 shows, each coefficient of change — excluding Construction and Other 
Services — remains statically significant, implying that the observed relationships in the data are 
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not simply due to change. However, the direction of each coefficient no longer remains 
overwhelmingly negative. The average coefficient of change increases nearly 6 points when 
accounting for incumbency advantage, from -7.94 to -1.0006. Additionally, a majority of 
industries, nine of thirteen, actually show a net benefit for Democrats, contrary to previous 
findings. Only the Goods and Service producing industries, supersector categories encompassing 
a wide variety of subsectors, retain a negative correlation with Democratic vote share. 
Interestingly enough, while these overarching categories preserve a negative correlation, each of 
their component industries return a positive correlation. These findings complicate 
interpretations of regression analysis; while on a national scale the statistical validity of this 
correlation seems strong, accounting for incumbency advantages seriously confounds the 
applicability of this relationship to a wide range of elections. 
 Examining variations in turnout creates a similar pattern of results. Table 8 shows 
variation in regression analysis between high turnout and low turnout elections. For elections 
conducted under low turnout levels, the data preserves a negative correlation with Democratic 
vote share, exhibiting an average coefficient of change of -2.687. Deviating from this pattern, the 
Service industry reverts back to its Table 5 relationship, with a positive coefficient of change for 
Democratic vote share. Additionally, each relationship by industry preserves its statistical 
significance.  
On the other hand, when accounting for elections with higher turnout on average, 
regression analysis finds far less conclusive results. In these elections, statistical significance 
takes the biggest hit, with five industries — Construction, Service-Providing, Education and 
Health, Leisure and Hospitality, and Government — exhibiting statistically insignificant 
correlations with changes in voter share for either party. Despite this decline in significance, 
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coefficients of change for most industries remained negative for Democratic vote share. The 
average coefficient of change for counties in elections with high turnout does not change much 
as compared to those with low turnout, equaling -2.27 — a change of less than half a point. 
Finally, in terms of outliers, the correlation between wages and voter share for workers in the 
Information sector seems particularly affected by changes in turnout. Data from high turnout 
elections show a positive correlation with Democratic vote share for Information sector 
employees, presenting the only major deviation from the pattern of negative correlations. In all, 
accounting for differing levels of turnout presents yet another challenge to the reliability of this 
relationship. Whereas examining incumbency advantages primarily impacted the magnitude of 
each coefficient of change, variations in turnout primarily impact each relationship’s statistical 
significance. This finding implies that each confounding factor impacts the applicability of 
regression findings, albeit in differing ways.
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Discussion 
 This study provides evidence for multiple significant findings pertaining to the 
relationship between industrial composition and changes in partisanship. First and foremost, as 
Table 2 shows, a county’s establishment ratio seems most relevant in examining a county’s 
industrial composition, rather than wage or employment metrics. This may be attributable to the 
overwhelming effect large establishments have on a surrounding area. Different industries 
necessarily employ differing amounts of employees; for example, it likely takes far more 
workers to run a hospital, which requires much more human labor, than it does to manufacture a 
car, which has become heavily automated and robotized. As such, examining differences in 
employment levels does not properly account for inter-industry variations in employment levels. 
Since the economy is measured primarily by output (GDP, for example), and establishments, not 
workers, are responsible for producing output, measuring changes in establishment ratio have a 
greater direct effect on a county’s distribution of economic output by industry than measuring 
employment or wage levels. 
 Second, this study shows mixed evidence in support of a relationship between changes in 
industrial composition and partisan variation between presidential elections. Using changes in 
establishment ratio as the primary independent variable, as was shown in Tables 3 and 4, there 
exists a weak relationship for only a few industries. Growth in these industries — Trade, 
Transport and Utilities, Information, and Education and Health — appear correlated with a 
decline in voter share for Democratic presidential candidates. A key similarity between these 
industries comes from the fact that each exists within the broad Service-Providing supersector of 
the NAICS. This observation, combined with the notion of America’s increasing transition 
towards becoming a service economy, provides evidence that Democratic success in future 
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elections may suffer in the wake of growing change in industrial composition (Buera, 2012). 
However, it is important to note that this hypothesized relationship does not hold for every 
industry examined, nor does the data show this relationship for every service-based industry. 
This implies that while a relationship between establishment ratio change and voter behavior 
may exist, its scope is limited to specific industries, precluding any broad interpretations from 
being rendered. 
 Scrutinizing the degree of heterogeneity within each analyzed economic sector might 
provide further insight into why the data exhibits such a poor and inconsistent correlation with 
political polarization. As previously mentioned, growth in the relatively narrow and homogenous 
sectors of Trade, Education and Health, and Information correlated with varying degrees of 
statistically significant political polarization. These sectors encompass relatively homogenous 
sectors of the economy; growth in the Health sector, for example, might ostensibly impact all 
employees in that sector to some degree. Since employees in these relatively similar sectors are 
equally impacted by growth in their industry, a relatively consistent voting bloc emerges 
amongst them, meaning their voter behavior patterns may be more consistent. On the other hand, 
employees in broader and more heterogeneous sectors — those that returned statistically 
insignificant results, such as Manufacturing — are not equally impacted by growth in their 
sectors. Growth in the manufacturing of automobiles will likely not impact the job prospects of 
those manufacturing computers. This presents an obstacle to generalizing the voter behavior 
patterns of such employees; since the impacts of growth in the large sector are manifested 
differently for different employees within varying subsectors of the large heterogeneous sector, it 
is difficult to make any sweeping conclusions regarding their voter behavior as a whole. This 
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may explain why statistically significant results only emerged for more homogeneous sectors of 
the NAICS. 
 Quantifying homogeneity presents a rather difficult task; however, using estimates of 
unionization rates as a proxy may help further explain variations between different industries. 
Unions, wherein employees of a particular economic sector engage in collective bargaining with 
employers as a unit rather than as individuals, necessarily entail a degree of interconnectedness 
and homogeneity within a sector. As many workers cooperate together to advocate for workplace 
benefits and higher wages, the effects of industrial growth or decline in a sector impact a larger 
portion of its employees. This starkly contrasts with less unionized industries, where workers are 
so far displaced and unconnected from one another’s actions that growth in their sector will not 
impact as broad a range of its employees. If this hypothesis holds, more homogeneous industries 
— those shown to exhibit statistically significant correlations with political partisanship above 
— should have higher rates of unionization as compared to heterogeneous industries.  
This hypothesis appears to be true. On average, the more homogenous and statistically 
significant sectors tend to have higher rates of union membership than the more heterogeneous 
sectors. In particular, workers in the Utilities subsector are represented by unions at a rate of 
24.1% (QCEW, 2018). Even smaller industries like Health Care and Educational Services 
participate in unions at rates of 8.2% and 13.5%, respectively. This is markedly different from 
more heterogeneous industries, like Financial Activities, whose members join unions at only a 
rate of 3.1%. Even geographically concentrated industries, such as Mining or Oil and Gas 
Extraction, exhibit a low rate of union participation at around 4.8%. Overall, using unionization 
rates presents an excellent opportunity, albeit far from the only metric available, to quantify the 
homogeneity of a particular sector. Since all of the statistically significant industries examined 
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hold higher rates of unionization than their statistically insignificant counterparts, this implies 
that one explanatory factor accounting for their differences may stem from variations in the 
interconnectedness of their workers. When variations in the economy at the industrial level 
impact all workers of a union, rather than being dispersed throughout the country, this signifies 
that the impacts of such variations will be felt by a large proportion of workers, contributing to 
statistically significant results. 
 Third, this study shows evidence for complications that arise when looking at regions of 
the country with highly concentrated industries, as measured in Table 4 by dividing the country 
by regions with high establishment ratios for the aforementioned statistically significant 
industries. In some cases, the magnitude of each coefficient grew in counties with near-
homogenous industrial composition. However, no discernable pattern came from this analysis; 
for most industries, the coefficient of change either completely reversed direction, remained 
unchanged, or even became statistically significant. These findings undermine the original logic 
behind this study’s key hypothesis.  
Originally, I hypothesized that one contributing factor toward a stronger correlation in 
highly concentrated industry might come from an increasing degree of homogeneity within each 
county’s voting bloc. With one industry dominating economic activity in a region, it could 
reasonably follow that most voters would have similar economic interests and therefore vote in 
both similar and more predictable manners to advance those interests. However, the opposite 
appears to be true, especially from an economic standpoint. Using income inequality as a metric 
of economic homogeneity, studies have shown that as the prevalence of sectors —specifically 
the Construction sector — increase in magnitude over time, income inequality actually decreases 
(Moore, 2009). This implies that economic homogenization of industrial composition may 
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actually contribute to a more diverse voting bloc. While I assumed conducting regression 
analysis in highly concentrated industries would bolster the strength of each correlation, in 
actuality this method of sorting only further complicated my results, meaning these findings are 
inconclusive at best. 
 Unlike changes in establishment ratio, analyzing the effects of variations in wage ratio 
returned surprisingly significant and powerful results. Table 5 demonstrates that increases in the 
wage ratio of workers in a county — in other terms, the wages of a county’s employees increase 
in comparison to the national average — correspond to a staunch decrease in vote share for 
Democrats. This implies that the more money a voter makes as compared to peers in the same 
industry, the more likely that voter is to vote for a Republican presidential candidate. Besides 
being the most statistically significant relationship of all those observed, this finding is made 
especially interesting due to the fact that the relationship does not vary by industry. Instead, we 
see the same negative correlation for growth in the wage ratio of nearly every industry, 
regardless of which field workers preside in. 
 The rationale for why such a relationship emerges in the data may stem from, at least in 
part, the variety of socioeconomic factors previously discussed. From a purely economic 
perspective, political scientists like Frey would argue that given a higher level of income as 
compared to one’s peers, the opportunity costs of voting diminish as wages increase (Frey, 
1971). Frey’s research, however, does not tune into the causal mechanism behind why higher 
wage ratios correlate with more Republican success. Studies on the impacts of broader causal 
mechanisms, such as those on socioeconomic status conducted by Kam or Hansen, fall similarly 
short. Their findings find evidence to support higher levels of turnout, but not higher levels of 
Republican partisanship. 
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 This is not to say that socioeconomic status and income play no role in explaining the 
effects of wage ratio; on the contrary, considering the findings of previous research in light of 
this study’s quantitative findings implies the positive effects on turnout from increases in 
socioeconomic status may disproportionately affect Republicans over Democrats. In fact, there 
exists evidence that such a causal relationship exists. A study by Dr. Benjamin Page analyzing 
the policy preferences of the top one percent of wage earners found that wealthy Americans are 
not only “extremely active” politically but tend to be more conservative than the public as a 
whole (Page, 2013). Additionally, these conservative beliefs tend to be strongest on issues of 
taxation, economic regulation, and social welfare — all issues that apply most heavily to those 
generating more income. These findings make sense with the data; as wage ratio directly relates 
with issues of income and socioeconomic status, increasing one’s income will likely increase the 
relevance of issues relating to maintaining a high level of financial security, which conservative 
policies tend to address. 
 The issue of financial security as it relates to partisanship received further attention in 
research conducted by Dr. Philipp Rehm. In his study, seeking to explain increased levels of 
polarization across the United States, Rehm argued that political affiliation derives partially from 
risk exposure, or the degree of uncertainty towards future income (Rehm, 2011). For those with 
lower incomes, Rehm’s work finds the greatest degree of risk exposure and thereby higher voter 
sympathy for Democrats, and vice versa. While his work notes the “overlapping concerns” of 
risk exposure for those with average income levels, this study lends itself well to explaining the 
effects of wage ratio change on political partisanship (Rehm, 2011). Higher wage ratios correlate 
to higher levels of income for workers on average, implying the risk of future wage loss has 
diminished. This may explain why increases in wage averages disproportionately benefit 
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Republicans across all industries. Since the value of income does not discriminate across 
industries —a dollar is worth a dollar, regardless of where it was earned — a positive 
relationship between wage ratio growth and conservative vote share should not discriminate 
either. 
 Although this study finds strong evidence for a correlation between wage ratio and 
partisanship, it does not come without a few exceptions and controls to take note of. The strong 
relationship between average wages and vote share for Democrats became significantly less 
convincing when separating counties by both incumbency and turnout. Further, each control 
impacted the validity of this relationship in different ways; incumbency primarily impacted the 
magnitude of correlation, whereas high turnout maintained similar coefficients at the cost of 
statistical significance. Overall, these findings present the limitations of this relationship for 
further study. Wage ratio tends to have the greatest impact on political partisanship in elections 
where no incumbent candidate is running, and turnout remains low. This seems to confirm 
previous studies on the effects of income, mentioned earlier. Since high levels of turnout 
generally correlate with Democratic success in elections, examining high turnout elections may 
explain why Table 8 found such confounding results (Hansford, 2010). In the absence of these 
effects, especially with low levels of turnouts, this study shows evidence that Republicans 
receive higher levels of support from voters who earn more than their average peers, regardless 
of industry. 
This finding comes with immense implications for how political scientists ought to study 
voter behavior; contrary to previous research, this finding moves emphasis away from where or 
how workers earn their wages and moves it toward further study of how workers’ wages 
compare with their peers. Considering the multitude of controls inherent to any study of voter 
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behavior, this study additionally invites further investigation into relationships between industrial 
composition and voter behavior. First, stemming directly from this study’s failure to surmount 
sufficient evidence in favor of a broad relationship between establishment change and voter 
behavior, further research might specifically examine variation within the aforementioned 
industries exhibiting significant results. Especially in the growing fields of Education, Health and 
Trade, further analysis of these industries might provide greater insight into the impact these 
establishments have on both their counties and the surrounding regions. Second, as it pertains to 
the effects of wage ratio change, this study presents an opportunity for a myriad of controls to be 
factored in to regression analysis on voter behavior. Beyond incumbency and turnout, further 
study might isolate additional controls that either undermine or bolster the statistical validity of 
this study’s findings. Perhaps factors such as popular opinion polls, lobbying efforts by industry, 
or a broader definition of socioeconomic status may play a role in influencing this relationship. 
Additionally, wage ratio change only represents one measure of income. Further study might 
consider grouping voters into income brackets to examine whether or not growth in wage ratio 
exhibits a uniform effect on vote share for voters from various household incomes. Finally, while 
this study specifically focused on presidential elections, further study might consider examining 
variations in partisan support at the congressional level, in order to further test the robustness of 
this relationship.
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Appendix I: NAICS Industry Classifications 
(About the Data, 2017) 
Industry Description 
Goods-Producing This supersector consists of all sectors of the economy 
pertaining to the production of goods. It includes a variety 
of subsectors employing nearly 20,000,000 people 
annually. 
Natural Resources and 
Mining 
This sector consists of two primary subsectors. The first, 
pertaining to agriculture, includes establishments engaged 
primarily in growing crops, raising animals, harvesting 
timber, or farming fish in a variety of settings. The second, 
pertaining to mining, includes establishments that extract 
naturally occurring solids, such as coal and other ores, as 
well as liquid materials and natural gasses. 
Construction This sector consists of all establishments engaged in the 
construction of buildings or engineering projects, including 
highways and utility systems. These establishments engage 
in the preparation of new sites for construction. 
Manufacturing This sector consists of all establishments engaged in the 
mechanical, physical, or chemical transformation of 
materials, substances, or components into new products. 
Service-Providing This supersector consists of a variety of establishments 
pertaining to the provision of services to individuals. It 
includes a variety of subsectors employing nearly 
127,677,000 million workers annually. 
Trade, Transportation, and 
Utilities 
This sector consists of multiple subsectors pertaining to the 
transportation and trade of services. These subsectors 
include: Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade, Transportation and 
Warehousing, and Utilities. 
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Information This sector consists of establishments engaged in one of the 
following processes: 
(a) Producing and distributing information and cultural 
products 
(b) Providing the means to transmit or distribute these 
products as well as data or communications 
(c) Processing data 
Financial Activities This sector consists of establishments engaged in the 
Finance and Insurance subsector, as well as those engaged 
in real estate sales or leasing. Financial institutions include 
raising funds through deposits or securities, incurring 
liabilities, pooling of risk, or other miscellaneous 
specialized services. 
Professional and Business 
Services 
This sector consists of establishments engaged in 
professional, scientific and technical services, as well as the 
management of companies and enterprises. Additionally, 
this sector includes those engaged in activities relating to 
administrative support and waste management services. 
Education and Health 
Services 
This sector consists of establishments that provide 
instruction and training in a wide range of subjects, both 
through specialized establishments (colleges, schools, etc.) 
and training centers. Additionally, this sector includes all 
establishments providing health care and social assistance 
for individuals. 
Leisure and Hospitality This sector consists of establishments engaged in activities 
relating to Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation, which 
conduct the following activities: 
(1) Promoting, producing, or participating in liver 
performances intended for public viewing 
(2) Preserving and sharing objects and sites of 
historical, cultural, or educational interest 
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(3) Operating facilities that enable patrons to 
participate in recreational activities or pursue 
amusement 
Additionally, this sector includes establishments that 
provide customers with either lodging or prepared 
meals. 
Other Services (Except Public 
Administration) 
This “catch-all” sector consists of establishments that 
provide services not specifically provided for in the 
classification system. These include: repairs, promotion, 
grant making, advocacy, pet care, parking services, dating 
services, and many others. 
Government (Federal) This sector consists of all establishments under the purview 
and operation of the federal government. 
  47 
APPENDIX II: CODE FOR DATA PROCESSING  
counties <- unique(d1$Area_x) 
counties <- counties[counties != ""] 
w <- as.data.frame(counties) 
Govt <- unique(d1$Ownership) 
Govt <- Govt[Govt != ""] 
Govt <- Govt[Govt != "Total Covered"] 
Govt <- Govt[Govt != "Private"] 
Industry <- unique(d1$Industry) 
Industry <- Industry[Industry != ""] 
Industry <- Industry[Industry != "Total, all industries"] 
Votes1 <- d1$TotalVotes[match(counties, d1$Area_x)] 
Votes2 <- d2$TotalVotes[match(counties, d2$Area_x)] 
AvgVotes <- (Votes1 + Votes2) / 2  
w$VoteShare <- AvgVotes / sum(AvgVotes, na.rm = TRUE) 
Dem1 <- d1$DemVotesMajorPercent[match(counties, d1$Area_x)] 
Dem2 <- d2$DemVotesMajorPercent[match(counties, d2$Area_x)] 
w$DemChange <- (Dem2 - Dem1) 
Rep1 <- d1$RepVotesMajorPercent[match(counties, d1$Area_x)] 
Rep2 <- d2$RepVotesMajorPercent[match(counties, d2$Area_x)] 
w$RepChange <- (Rep2 - Rep1) 
for (I in Industry) { 
  w[paste(I, "Establishment.Ratio1", sep=" ")] <- merge(w, d1[d1$Industry == I, c("Area_x", 
"Establishment.Ratio")], by.x = "counties", by.y = "Area_x", all.x = TRUE, all.y = FALSE, 
incomparables = NA)$Establishment.Ratio 
  w[paste(I, "Establishment.Ratio2", sep=" ")] <- merge(w, d2[d2$Industry == I, c("Area_x", 
"Establishment.Ratio")], by.x = "counties", by.y = "Area_x", all.x = TRUE, all.y = FALSE, 
incomparables = NA)$Establishment.Ratio 
  w[paste(I, "Establishment.Ratio.Change", sep=" ")] <- (w[paste(I, "Establishment.Ratio2", 
sep=" ")] - w[paste(I, "Establishment.Ratio1", sep=" ")]) 
} ## Establishment Ratios 
for (I in Industry) { 
 w[paste(I, "Employment.Ratio1", sep=" ")] <- merge(w, d1[d1$Industry == I, c("Area_x", 
"Employment.Ratio")], by.x = "counties", by.y = "Area_x", all.x = TRUE, all.y = FALSE, 
incomparables = NA)$Employment.Ratio 
 w[paste(I, "Employment.Ratio2", sep=" ")] <- merge(w, d2[d2$Industry == I, c("Area_x", 
"Employment.Ratio")], by.x = "counties", by.y = "Area_x", all.x = TRUE, all.y = FALSE, 
incomparables = NA)$Employment.Ratio 
 w[paste(I, "Employment.Ratio.Change", sep=" ")] <- (w[paste(I, "Employment.Ratio2", sep=" 
")] - w[paste(I, "Employment.Ratio1", sep=" ")]) 
} ## Employment Ratios GOVT 
for (I in Industry) { 
 w[paste(I, "Total.Wage.Location.Quotient.Relative.to.U.S.1", sep=" ")] <- merge(w, 
d1[d1$Industry == I, c("Area_x", "Total.Wage.Location.Quotient.Relative.to.U.S.")], by.x = 
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"counties", by.y = "Area_x", all.x = TRUE, all.y = FALSE, incomparables = 
NA)$Total.Wage.Location.Quotient.Relative.to.U.S. 
 w[paste(I, "Total.Wage.Location.Quotient.Relative.to.U.S.2", sep=" ")] <- merge(w, 
d2[d2$Industry == I, c("Area_x", "Total.Wage.Location.Quotient.Relative.to.U.S.")], by.x = 
"counties", by.y = "Area_x", all.x = TRUE, all.y = FALSE, incomparables = 
NA)$Total.Wage.Location.Quotient.Relative.to.U.S. 
 w[paste(I, "Total.Wage.Location.Quotient.Relative.to.U.S.Change", sep=" ")] <- (w[paste(I, 
"Total.Wage.Location.Quotient.Relative.to.U.S.2", sep=" ")] - w[paste(I, 
"Total.Wage.Location.Quotient.Relative.to.U.S.1", sep=" ")]) 
} ## Wage Ratios END INDUSTRY BEGIN GOVT 
for (G in Govt) { 
 w[paste(G, "Establishment.Ratio1", sep=" ")] <- merge(w, d1[d1$Ownership == G, c("Area_x", 
"Establishment.Ratio")], by.x = "counties", by.y = "Area_x", all.x = TRUE, all.y = FALSE, 
incomparables = NA)$Establishment.Ratio 
 w[paste(G, "Establishment.Ratio2", sep=" ")] <- merge(w, d2[d2$Ownership == G, c("Area_x", 
"Establishment.Ratio")], by.x = "counties", by.y = "Area_x", all.x = TRUE, all.y = FALSE, 
incomparables = NA)$Establishment.Ratio 
 w[paste(G, "Establishment.Ratio.Change", sep=" ")] <- (w[paste(G, "Establishment.Ratio2", 
sep=" ")] - w[paste(G, "Establishment.Ratio1", sep=" ")]) 
} ## Establishment Ratios GOVT 
for (G in Govt) { 
 w[paste(G, "Employment.Ratio1", sep=" ")] <- merge(w, d1[d1$Ownership == G, c("Area_x", 
"Employment.Ratio")], by.x = "counties", by.y = "Area_x", all.x = TRUE, all.y = FALSE, 
incomparables = NA)$Employment.Ratio 
 w[paste(G, "Employment.Ratio2", sep=" ")] <- merge(w, d2[d2$Ownership == G, c("Area_x", 
"Employment.Ratio")], by.x = "counties", by.y = "Area_x", all.x = TRUE, all.y = FALSE, 
incomparables = NA)$Employment.Ratio 
 w[paste(G, "Employment.Ratio.Change", sep=" ")] <- (w[paste(G, "Employment.Ratio2", sep=" 
")] - w[paste(G, "Employment.Ratio1", sep=" ")]) 
} ## Employment Ratios GOVT 
for (G in Govt) { 
 w[paste(G, "Total.Wage.Location.Quotient.Relative.to.U.S.1", sep=" ")] <- merge(w, 
d1[d1$Ownership == G, c("Area_x", "Total.Wage.Location.Quotient.Relative.to.U.S.")], by.x = 
"counties", by.y = "Area_x", all.x = TRUE, all.y = FALSE, incomparables = 
NA)$Total.Wage.Location.Quotient.Relative.to.U.S. 
 w[paste(G, "Total.Wage.Location.Quotient.Relative.to.U.S.2", sep=" ")] <- merge(w, 
d2[d2$Ownership == G, c("Area_x", "Total.Wage.Location.Quotient.Relative.to.U.S.")], by.x = 
"counties", by.y = "Area_x", all.x = TRUE, all.y = FALSE, incomparables = 
NA)$Total.Wage.Location.Quotient.Relative.to.U.S. 
 w[paste(G, "Total.Wage.Location.Quotient.Relative.to.U.S.Change", sep=" ")] <- (w[paste(G, 
"Total.Wage.Location.Quotient.Relative.to.U.S.2", sep=" ")] - w[paste(G, 
"Total.Wage.Location.Quotient.Relative.to.U.S.1", sep=" ")]) 
} ## Wage Ratios GOVT 
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APPENDIX III: REGRESSION RESULTS 
(QCED, 2018); (Voting and Elections Collection, 2018) 
TABLE 2: R-SQUARED VALUES FOR NATIONAL REGRESSION 
Economic Indicator R-Squared 
Establishment Ratio 0.06629 
Employment Ratio 0.03124 
Wage Ratio 0.04096 
 
SIGNIFICANCE CODES FOR REGRESSION 
Code P-Value 
(.) > 0.05 
(*) > 0.01 
(**) > 0.001 
(***) > 0 
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TABLE 3: NATIONAL REGRESSION RESULTS  
ESTABLISHMENT RATIO, DEMOCRATIC VOTE SHARE 
Industry Coefficient P-Value 
Intercept -0.73122 < 2E-16 (***) 
Goods-Producing 28.42052 0.73545 
Natural Resources and 
Mining 
17.01995 0.81543 
Construction 52.41784 0.47134 
Manufacturing -48.98939 0.50205 
Service-Providing 103.42745 0.11081 
Trade, Transportation, and 
Utilities 
-15.05071 0.00376 (**) 
Information -105.44918 0.000000000191 (***) 
Financial Activities 8.06379 0.27676 
Professional and Business 
Services 
2.09279 0.68533 
Education and Health 
Services 
-15.30405 0.0000407 (***) 
Leisure and Hospitality 10.16796 0.22604 
Other Services (Except Public 
Administration) 
-27.20267 0.000000000000203 (***) 
Government (Federal) 501.03234 0.0000000000000557 (***) 
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TABLE 4: REGIONAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
ESTABLISHMENT RATIO, DEMOCRATIC VOTE SHARE 
Region Industry Original 
Coefficient 
New 
Coefficient 
P-Value 
Trade, 
Transportation, 
and Utilities 
(R-Squared = 
0.09372) 
    
 Trade, 
Transportation, 
and Utilities 
-15.05071 87.483 0.0000244 (***) 
 Information 105.44918 6.6034 0.885 
 Education and 
Health 
15.30405 60.3777 0.008574 (**) 
 Other Services 27.20267 97.8302 0.00000926 (***) 
 Federal 
Government 
501.03234 344.6051 0.001662 (**) 
Information 
(R-Squared = 
0.07382) 
    
 Trade, 
Transportation, 
and Utilities 
-15.05071 -11.406 0.331 
 Information 105.44918 -176.0044 0.00000000000312 
(***) 
 Education and 
Health 
15.30405 -8.8621 0.242 
 Other Services 27.20267 -21.9142 0.00329 (**) 
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 Federal 
Government 
501.03234 414.9652 0.00109 (**) 
Education and 
Health 
(R-Squared = 
0.08268) 
    
 Trade, 
Transportation, 
and Utilities 
-15.05071 -4.6068 0.639 
 Information 105.44918 -10.3981 0.779 
 Education and 
Health 
15.30405 23.5842 0.000318 (***) 
 Other Services 27.20267 11.9862 0.069063 (.) 
 Federal 
Government 
501.03234 556.3898 0.000434 (***) 
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TABLE 5: NATIONAL REGRESSION RESULTS  
WAGE RATIO, DEMOCRATIC VOTE SHARE 
Industry Coefficient P-Value 
Intercept 0.04054 0.33553 
Goods-Producing -4.18857 0.00000000000118 (***) 
Natural Resources and 
Mining 
-0.39581 0.0000000000406 (***) 
Construction -0.54741 0.00901(**) 
Manufacturing -2.11942 0.00000000343(***) 
Service-Providing 11.27888 0.0000000449 (***) 
Trade, Transportation, and 
Utilities 
-9.6485 0.0000000449 (***) 
Information -1.23753 0.0000000000265 (***) 
Financial Activities -5.53816 < 2e-16 (***) 
Professional and Business 
Services 
-6.40398 < 2e-16 (***) 
Education and Health 
Services 
-3.75251 0.00000000000000419 (***) 
Leisure and Hospitality -1.60197 0.000000000558 (***) 
Other Services (Except Public 
Administration) 
-1.8089 0.000000000000000389 
(***) 
 Government (Federal) -1.02175 0.000000221 (***) 
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TABLE 6: REGIONAL REGRESSION RESULTS 
WAGE RATIO, DEMOCRATIC VOTE SHARE 
Region Industry Original 
Coefficient 
New 
Coefficient 
P-Value 
Trade, 
Transportation, 
and Utilities 
(R-Squared = 
0.1031) 
    
 Trade, 
Transportation, 
and Utilities 
-9.6485 -16.06664 < 2e-16 (***) 
 Information -1.23753 -3.7948 0.00000000011 
(***) 
 Education and 
Health 
-3.75251 -9.80184 < 2e-16 (***) 
 Other Services -1.8089 -3.41257 0.0000000117 (***) 
 Federal 
Government 
-1.02175 -3.09383 0.000000000000348 
(***) 
Information 
(R Squared = 
0.0353) 
    
 Trade, 
Transportation, 
and Utilities 
-9.6485 -7.37446 0.000000028 (***) 
 Information -1.23753 -1.32001 0.0000347 (***) 
 Education and 
Health 
-3.75251 -5.13194 0.0000115 (***) 
 Other Services -1.8089 -2.13573 0.0000665 (***) 
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 Federal 
Government 
-1.02175 -1.19403 0.020496 (*) 
Education and 
Health  
(R-Squared = 
0.0498) 
    
 Trade, 
Transportation, 
and Utilities 
-9.6485 -11.395302 0.013773 (*) 
 Information -1.23753 -0.415228 0.26 
 Education and 
Health 
-3.75251 -2.744156 0.006186 (**) 
 Other Services -1.8089 -1.804682 0.000011 (***) 
 Federal 
Government 
-1.02175 0.204075 0.265029 
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TABLE 7: INCUMBENCY REGRESSION RESULTS  
WAGE RATIO, DEMOCRATIC VOTE SHARE 
Industry Coefficient 
(Incumbency) 
R-Squred = 
0.05128 
P-Value Coefficient 
(No 
Incumb.) 
R Squred = 
0.09631 
P-Value 
Intercept -0.37442 <2e-16 (***) -0.73956 <2e-16 (***) 
Goods-Producing -3.93227 0.0000000196 
(***) 
-5.04409 0.00000000516 
(***) 
Natural Resources 
and Mining 
0.1621 0.025573 (*) -0.72364 <2e-16 (***) 
Construction 0.09752 0.678703 -0.83087 0.00951 (**) 
Manufacturing -0.75858 0.087555 (.) -2.51797 0.000000718 (***) 
Service-Providing -23.38026 <2e-16 (***) -35.57961 <2e-16 (***) 
Trade, 
Transportation, and 
Utilities 
1.925 0.018836 (*) -16.72675 
 
<2e-16 (***) 
Information 0.54353 0.010672 (*) -2.31605 <2e-16 (***) 
Financial Activities 1.77295 0.000221 (***) -9.52813 <2e-16 (***) 
Professional and 
Business Services 
3.69424 0.0000000140 
(***) 
-13.22982 <2e-16 (***) 
Education and 
Health Services 
5.51948 <2e-16 (***) -10.60408 <2e-16 (***) 
Leisure and 
Hospitality 
0.8882 0.001164 (**) 3.15828 0.000000000000551 
(***) 
Other Services 
(Except Public 
Administration) 
-0.02288 0.927803 -3.23717 <2e-16 (***) 
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 Government 
(Federal) 
0.48487 0.021514 (*) -2.30044 0.000000000000 
(***) 
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TABLE 8: TURNOUT REGRESSION RESULTS  
WAGE RATIO, DEMOCRATIC VOTE SHARE 
Industry Coefficient 
(Low 
Turnout) 
R-Squared 
= 0.09162 
P-Value Coefficient 
(High 
Turnout) 
R-Squared 
= 0.05503 
P-Value 
Intercept -0.94344 <2e-16 (***) 0.91274 <2e-16 (***) 
Goods-
Producing 
-5.90948 0.000584 (***) -3.52288 0.00000000179 (***) 
Natural 
Resources and 
Mining 
-0.26858 0.032825 (*) -0.42684 0.000000000210 (***) 
Construction -1.3799 0.002648 (**) -0.29963 0.20117 
Manufacturing -3.98303 0.000276 (***) -1.82589 0.000000790 (***) 
Service-
Providing 
19.08045 0.0000000343 
(***) 
-1.14953 0.672 
Trade, 
Transportation, 
and Utilities 
-14.51781 <2e-16 (***) -6.81731 0.000000000000000235 
(***) 
Information -3.26191 <2e-16 (***) 0.42819 0.06815 (.) 
Financial 
Activities 
-4.02465 0.0000000000765 
(***) 
-7.89975 <2e-16 (***) 
Professional and 
Business Services 
-8.22129 <2e-16 (***) -5.07172 0.000000000229 (***) 
Education and 
Health Services 
-5.64776 <2e-16 (***) -0.3964 0.576 
Leisure and 
Hospitality 
-3.09146 <2e-16 (***) -0.46739 0.219 
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Other Services 
(Except Public 
Administration) 
-1.87351 0.00000000417 
(***) 
-2.07651 0.00000000000307 
(***) 
 Government 
(Federal) 
-1.84047 0.0000000000248 
(***) 
-0.12237 0.653 
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